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1. Introduction 
Dramatic advances in neonatal medical information and technology occur daily and these 
advances are being implemented almost immediately. Despite the dramatic technological 
advances, diagnostic and prognostic certainty for many neonatal conditions remains 
illusive. As a result, the appropriate decision-makers have to decide whether some 
handicapped newborns, such as those with congenital anomalies, low-birth-weights, and 
genetic defects, should be treated aggressively or not at all. This uncertainty has led to many 
handicapped newborns with serious congenital anomalies being treated aggressively. This 
treatment prolongs the lives of many newborns when in the past they would have been 
allowed to die. Such life-prolonging treatment decisions have far-reaching ramifications. 
One thing that is clear to serious observers in the field is that the implementation of medical 
advances and technology for some newborns is a mixed blessing at best. Despite proposed 
federal regulations (1984 Child Abuse Law)1 and medical guidelines (American Academy of 
Pediatrics) 2 that have helped to clarify treatment issues, there is still no consensus among 
responsible decision-makers on a moral criterion to assist parents and health care 
professionals on treatment decisions. There is general agreement within the medical, legal, 
and ethical professions that there are some handicapped newborns, in particular situations, 
whose lives need not be saved. Consensus ends, however, when an attempt is made to 
determine which specific newborns should receive or not receive medical treatment. This 
diversity of opinions has brought to the forefront the urgent need for a normative moral 
criterion to assist decision-makers in their discernment of treatment decisions for these 
never-competent patients.3 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed analysis of the 1984 Child Abuse Law, see Department of Health and Human 
Services, AChild Abuse and Neglect: Prevention and Treatment,@ reprinted from The Federal Register 50 
(April 15, 1985), no. 72: Rules and Regulations, part 1340, 14887-14892. 
2 For a more detailed analysis of the guidelines of the American Academy of Pediatrics, see American 
Academy of Pediatrics, AJoint Policy Statement: Principles Of Treatment Of Disabled Infants,@ Pediatrics 
73 (1984): 559-560; and American Academy of Pediatrics, AGuidelines For Infant Bioethics Review 
Committees,@ Pediatrics 74 (1984): 306-310. 
3 There is an ethical distinction regarding competent, noncompetent and never-competent patients. A 
competent patient is one who can make decisions regarding health care for him or herself. A 
www.intechopen.com
 
Contemporary Issues in Bioethics 
 
70
Today, parents and health care professionals are often forced to draw lines between newborns 
who will be treated and those who will not be. If these lines are being drawn, then ethicist 
Richard A. McCormick argues, "it is of public importance that we find out the criteria by 
which they are being drawn. My attempt is to search our tradition on the meaning of life and 
so forth and see if we couldn’t develop criteria.”[1] Realizing the magnitude of this problem, 
McCormick has established a moral criterion for treatment decisions regarding handicapped 
newborns as a revised natural-law ethicist in the Roman Catholic tradition. 
As a revised natural-law ethicist, McCormick has always sought a balanced middle course 
between extreme positions--a course which he understands as characteristic of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition.4 Few, if any, physicians are willing to make substantive criteria when it 
comes to treatment decisions for handicapped newborns. On the other hand, moral 
theologians, in their concern to avoid total normlessness and arbitrariness, can easily become 
quite dogmatic. [2] Between the two extremes of the physician's lack of concrete criteria and 
the theologian's dogmatism, it can be argued that there is a middle course that entails 
substantive criteria to assist decision-makers regarding treatment decisions for handicapped 
newborns. McCormick has proposed a patient-centered, quality-of-life criterion that can be 
used by appropriate decision-makers in determining treatment decisions for handicapped 
newborns. The significance of McCormick’s quality-of-life criterion is that it offers the 
appropriate decision-makers, for never-competent newborns, a practical, beneficial, and 
appropriate moral criterion that is not only reasonable and coherent but is grounded in a 
tradition that promotes the best interests of handicapped newborns. 
The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to present a case of a child born with 
thanatophoric dysplasia; second to examine McCormick's moral criterion as it applies to the 
anomaly presented and to five diagnostic treatment categories, established by this author, 
which span the spectrum of neonatal defects; third, to assess whether McCormick's moral 
criterion is an appropriate moral criterion for the decision-makers of handicapped newborns. 
2. Case study – Thanatophoric dysplasia 
On September 25, 2004 Baby X was born with a genetic condition called thanatophoric 
dysplasia. His condition was diagnosed in utero and upon birth he was placed on 
                                                                                                                            
noncompetent patient is one who was once competent, but now lacks that decision-making capacity. A 
never-competent patient is one who never had this decision-making capacity and never will have it in the 
future.  
4 McCormick uses as an example the traditional obligation to preserve life. He argues that the 
Christian tradition Ahas always strived to maintain a middle course between two extremes: medical-
moral utopianism, i.e., sustaining life at all costs and with all means because when life is over 
everything is over and death is an absolute end, and its opposite, medical-moral pessimism, i.e., there is 
no point in sustaining life if it is accompanied by suffering, lack of function, etc. Both of these extremes 
are basic devaluations of human life because they remove life from the context which gives it its 
ultimate significance. The middle path is a recognition of the facts that human life is a basic value, the 
most basic value, because it is the foundation for all other values and achievements, but that life is not 
the absolute good and death the ultimate and absolute evil.@ McCormick, AA Proposal For >Quality Of 
Life= Criteria For Sustaining Life,@ Hospital Progress 56 (September 1975): 76. 
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mechanical ventilation to give the medical team additional time to confirm the diagnosis. 
Besides mechanical ventilation the child also received artificial nutrition and hydration 
through a feeding tube and was kept unconscious and sedated for comfort. After numerous 
consultations from various pediatric specialists the medical team decided that to continue 
aggressive medical treatment was futile and only prolonged the child’s dying process. The 
child’s mother was unsure if withholding aggressive medical treatment was ethical and 
sought additional guidance. 
Thanatophoric dysplasia (TD), also called thanatophoric dwarfism, was discovered in 1967 
by Pierre Maroteaux and his coworkers who used the Greek term “thanatophoric” meaning 
death-bringing. It is the most common form of skeletal dysplasia in humans. It occurs in 3 to 
4 per 100,000 live births and is due to autosomal dominant sporadic de novo mutations in the 
fibroblast growth factor receptor 3 (FGFR3) gene mapped to chromosome band 4p16.3. This 
gene codes for the FGFR3 transmembrane receptor expressed largely by skeletal and brain 
tissues in the developing fetus where it is involved with growth regulation.[3] Male and 
female fetuses are equally affected. There are two subtypes, TD1 and TD2, based on genetic-
phenotypic differences, although features may overlap. TD1 is associated with radiographic 
findings of short curved (“telephone receiver”) femurs, with or without a clover-leaf skull 
deformity. TD2 is associated with straight, longer femurs, and clover-leaf skull. The genetic 
mutation responsible for TD1 leads to an arginine to cysteine amino acid substitution at 
position 248, whereas for TD2, it leads to a lysine to glutamine substitution at position 650 of 
the FGFR3 receptor.5 However, the distinction does not alter the management. 
Neonates with TD invariably develop severe respiratory distress at birth due to lung 
hypoplasia requiring ventilation. The only means available to treat this condition is 
respiratory support. If the diagnosis is known ante-natally, then the parents would have the 
option of withholding active resuscitation. However, if the diagnosis is uncertain then, 
active resuscitation will buy time for further investigations until the diagnosis is 
determined. Physical findings manifest at birth include a bulging forehead, proptosis, flat 
nasal bridge, narrow chest, protuberant abdomen, and short limbs. A babygram should be 
done which may reveal characteristic telephone receiver femurs, flaring of the long bone 
metaphyses, short ribs, flat vertebral bodies, widened intervertebral disk spaces, a short 
pelvis with small sacroiliac notch, and cloverleaf skull deformity.6 
Most babies with TD die within the first few hours of life from respiratory insufficiency 
secondary to reduced thoracic capacity or compression of the brainstem. Management 
concerns are limited to extreme life support measures for the newborn. In the rare cases of 
long-term survival (a 4.7 year male and 3.7 year female),[4] the management consists in 
treatment of manifestations: respiratory support (tracheostomy, ventilation); medication to 
control seizures; shunt placement when hydrocephaly is identified; suboccipital 
decompression for relief of craniocervical junction constriction; hearing aids when hearing 
loss is identified and orthopedic evaluation upon development of joint contractures of joint 
hypermobility.[5] 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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This case is an excellent example of how parents in consultation with health care 
professionals struggle to decide whether certain medical treatments are medically 
proportionate or disproportionate and in the best interest of the child. 
3. McCormick’s criterion 
McCormick will determine how treatment decisions are made for handicapped newborns 
by proposing his normative understanding of best interests which evolves gradually into his 
quality-of-life criterion. This is a patient-centered, teleological assessment, which is based on 
a normative understanding of what reasonable persons ought to choose in a particular 
situation for the never-competent patient.7 It appears that McCormick's quality-of-life 
criterion is nothing more than a further specification of his normative understanding of best 
interests.8  McCormick has a normative understanding of best interests because, as social 
beings, our good, our flourishing (therefore, our best interests) is inextricably bound up with 
the well-being of others".9 The best interests category is a composite category that involves 
quality-of-life considerations, benefit-burden considerations, and the use of proportionate 
reason as a tool for establishing what is promotive or destructive for the good of the person 
integrally and adequately considered".10 McCormick understands quality of life to be an 
                                                 
7 The structure and individual components that makeup McCormick=s moral criterion for decision-
making are normative; they center on what Aought@ to be the case, not what Ais@ the case. By 
normative McCormick means what the never-competent patient would want because he or she Aought@ 
to want it. The never-competent patient Aought@ to make this choice because it is in his/her Abest 
interests.@ For a more detailed analysis of McCormick=s position on a normative understanding of his 
patient-centered approach, see McCormick, AThe Rights Of The Voiceless,@ How Brave A New World?, 
99-113. 
8 Ethicist Robert Weir disagrees with McCormick on this point. Weir argues that the quality-of-life 
criterion and best interests criterion are distinct and separate. McCormick responds to Weir by stating: AI 
believe Weir is wrong when he asserts that for those who use quality-of-life assessment, >it is not 
necessary to consider the best interest of the neonate.=  It is precisely because one is focused on best 
interests that qualitative considerations cannot be ignored but indeed are central. Weir is clearly afraid that 
quality-of-life considerations will be unfair. But they need not be. It all depends on where the line is drawn. 
I am all the more convinced of the inseparable unity and general overlap of best interests and quality-of-
life considerations when I study Weir=s clinical applications of his ethical criteria.@ McCormick, review of 
Selective Nontreatment Of Handicapped Newborns, by Robert Weir, in Perspectives In Biology And 
Medicine 29 (Winter 1986): 328. 
9 McCormick, AThe Rights Of The Voiceless,@ How Brave A New World?, 101. It should be noted that 
McCormick=s understanding of Abest interests@ is grounded in his Arevised@ natural law position. AI 
believe we do have reasons for assuming we know in many cases what an incompetent would want. 
We may assume that most people are reasonable, and that being such they would choose what is in 
their best interest. At least this is a safe and protective guideline to follow in structuring our conduct 
toward them when they cannot speak. The assumption may be factually and per accidens incorrect. But I 
am convinced that it will not often be. . . . I believe most of us want to act reasonably within parameters 
that are objective in character, even though we do not always do so. Or at least I think it good protective 
policy to assume this.@ Ibid., 104-105. 
10 It should be noted that when McCormick refers to benefits in his Abest interests@ category it is not 
restricted to medical benefits. Benefits also apply to social and familial benefits. This notion of Abenefit@ 
originates in Pellegrino=s four components of Abest interests@ that McCormick has incorporated into 
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elusive term whose meaning varies according to context. However, at a more profound 
level, when the issue is preserving human life, the term assumes a more basic meaning. "Just 
as life itself is a condition for any other value or achievement, so certain characteristics of life 
are the conditions for the achievement of other values. We must distinguish between two 
sets of conditions: those that allow us to do things well, easily, comfortably, and efficiently, 
and those that allow us to do them at all".[6] The quality-of-life criterion is ethically 
significant for parents and health care professionals, because it represents not only the value 
of the whole person, but it affirms that respect for the human person entails considering all 
the relevant factors and circumstances that are involved in any situation.           
There are real difficulties in trying to establish a perfectly rational criterion for making 
quality-of-life judgments. To make his quality-of-life criterion more concrete, McCormick 
will establish two guidelines and four norms that will further specify his criterion. The first 
guideline developed for dealing with never-competent patients focuses on the potential for 
human relationships associated with the infant's condition. By relational potential 
McCormick means "the hope that the infant will, in relative comfort, be able to experience 
our caring and love".11 Specifically, he proposes that "if a newborn baby had no potential for 
such relationships or if the potential would be totally submerged in the mere struggle to 
survive, then that baby had achieved its potential and further life-prolonging efforts were 
not mandatory, that is, would no longer be in the best interests of the baby".[7]Therefore, 
according to this guideline, when a never-competent patient, even with treatment, will have 
no potential for human relationships, the appropriate decision-makers can decide to 
withhold treatment and allow the patient to die.12 McCormick claims this quality-of-life 
approach has its foundation in the traditional ordinary-extraordinary means distinction that 
was later clarified by Pius XII.13 This is not an easy guideline to apply, especially in the case 
of never-competent patients. In essence, this guideline requires that the appropriate 
decision-makers must be able to determine if a minimally accepted quality of life can be 
expected. This determination ought to be made on the basis of the never-competent's best 
interests understood normatively. This guideline does not depreciate the value of the never-
                                                                                                                            
his Abest interests@ category. For a more detailed analysis of Pellegrino=s position, see Edmund 
Pellegrino, M.D., AMoral Choice, The Good Of The Patient And The Patient=s Good,@ in Ethics And 
Critical Care Medicine, eds. J. C. Moskop & L. Kopelman (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1985), 117-
138. 
11 McCormick, ATo Save Or Let Die,@ 351. 
12 This does not mean that once a decision has been made to forego or discontinue treatment, that 
the dying person is not treated with dignity and respect. For McCormick, even though a person has 
reached his or her potential and no treatment is recommended, as members of society we still have a 
moral obligation to give comfort to the person while he or she is in the dying process. That comfort 
would consist in palliative care. Palliative care is aimed at controlling pain, relieving discomfort, and 
aiding dysfunction of various sorts. 
13 McCormick quotes Pius XII as saying that an obligation to use any means possible Awould be too 
burdensome for most men and would render the attainment of the higher, more important good too 
difficult.@ Pius XII, AThe Prolongation Of Life,@ Acta Apostolicae Sedis 49 (1957): 1,031-1,032. McCormick 
understands Pius XII to say that certain treatments may be refused because it would lead to a life that 
lacks the proper quality. Leonard J. Weber, Who Shall Live?: The Dilemma Of Severely Handicapped 
Children And Its Meaning For Other Moral Questions, (New York: Paulist Press, 1976),  69. 
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competent individual but affirms that a genuine respect for the person demands attention to 
the prospects held out by continued life.14 
This guideline of the potential for human relationships has been criticized for being too 
general and open to possible abuse.15 McCormick himself stated when he advanced this 
guideline that it was "general and rather vague. But this is the way it is with all moral 
norms.” 16 Despite being convinced that this guideline is fundamentally sound, McCormick 
understood that he must further concretize it. Specifically, there are those circumstances 
when the never-competent patient has the potential for human relationships, but the 
underlying medical condition is critical and will result in imminent death, or after treatment 
has been initiated it becomes apparent that the treatment is medically futile.17 In these two 
situations it is clear that, besides the potential for human relationships, McCormick must 
incorporate an additional guideline that can weigh the benefits and burdens of certain 
treatments. 
The second guideline of McCormick=s quality-of-life criterion is the benefit-burden 
evaluation. "Where medical procedures are in question, it is generally admitted that the 
criterion to be used is a benefits-burdens estimate . . . The question posed is: Will the burden 
of the treatment outweigh the benefits to the patient?  The general answer: If the treatment is 
useless or futile, or it imposes burdens that outweigh the benefits, it may be omitted".[8] As 
                                                 
14 Lisa Sowle Cahill, AOn Richard McCormick: Reason And Faith In Post-Vatican II Catholic 
Ethics,,@ in Theological Voices In Medical Ethics eds. Allen Verhey & Stephen Lammers (Grand Rapids, 
MI.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993):  91. The potential for human relationships is based in 
the Catholic tradition. McCormick bases this potential for human relationships in the Catholic tradition. 
The Christian story does not yield concrete answers and fixed rules, but it does yield various 
perspectives and insights that inform human reasoning. One such insight is that human life is a basic 
good but not an absolute good. Since human life is a relative good, and the duty to preserve it is a 
limited one, then it is not always morally obligatory to use all means to preserve human life if a person 
cannot attain the higher more important good. For McCormick, the Ahigher@ more important good is 
the capacity for relationships of love. The core of this guideline is developed from the love 
commandment found in the New Testament.  
15 Both Leonard Weber and John Connery have criticized McCormick=s quality-of-life criterion. For 
a more detailed analysis, see Weber, Who Shall Live?: The Dilemma Of Severely Handicapped Children 
And Its Meaning For Other Moral Questions (New York: Paulist Press, 1976) and John Connery, 
AQuality Of Life,@ Linacre Quarterly 53 (February 1986): 26-33. 
16  AThey really root in general assertions that must be fleshed out by experience, modified by 
discussion and consultation, propped up and strengthened by cautions and qualifications. It is in the 
process of their application that moral norms take on added concreteness.@McCormick, ATo Save Or Let 
Die: State Of The Questions,@ America 131 (October 5, 1974): 171. 
17 It should be noted that the term Amedically futile@ is an elusive and ambiguous term. There are four 
major types of medical futility. First, physiological futility--an intervention cannot lead to the intended 
physiological effect. Second, imminent demise futility--an intervention may be futile if despite that 
intervention the patient will die in the very near future (this is sometimes expressed as the patient will not 
survive to discharge, although that is not really equivalent to dying in the near future). Third, lethal 
condition futility--an intervention may be futile if the patient has an underlying lethal condition which the 
intervention does not affect and which will result in death in the not too far future (weeks, perhaps 
months, but not in years) even if the intervention is employed. Fourth, qualitative futility--an intervention 
may be futile if it fails to lead to an acceptable quality of life. For a more detailed analysis of medical 
futility, see Baruch A. Brody and Amir Halevy, AIs Futility A Futile Concept?@ Journal Of Medicine And 
Philosophy 20 (April 1995): 126-129. 
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is the case with his first guideline, McCormick claims the benefit-burden evaluation emerges 
out of the ordinary-extraordinary means distinction.  
McCormick believes that his notion of benefit-burden evaluation within his quality-of-life 
criterion is a logical development of the ordinary-extraordinary means distinction, or what 
he refers to as an extension of the tradition into new problem areas.18 McCormick believes 
that the ordinary-extraordinary means distinction has an honorable history and an enduring 
validity. However, he argues that these terms "summarize and promulgate judgments 
drawn on other grounds. It is these other grounds that cry out for explication".19 To 
further explain these other grounds, McCormick reformulates the ordinary-extraordinary 
means distinction by advancing his benefit-burden evaluation. An extraordinary means is 
one that offers the patient no real benefit, or offers it at a disproportionate cost. For 
McCormick, one is called to make a moral judgment: Does the benefit of a proposed 
medical intervention really outweigh the harm it will inevitably produce? This is a 
quality-of-life judgment. The benefit-burden interpretation is not a departure from the 
Catholic tradition. It is a reformulation of the tradition in order to deal with contemporary 
bioethical problem areas.20  
The reason for this reformulation of the tradition is that over the centuries the ordinary-
extraordinary means distinction has become less objective and more relative because 
medicine and technology have become more sophisticated. The medical profession is 
committed to curing disease and preserving life. Today, we have the medical technology to 
make this commitment a reality. However, McCormick argues that "this commitment must 
be implemented within a healthy and realistic acknowledgment that we are mortal."[9]   
Therefore, there is a need to reformulate the basic value of human life under new 
circumstances. For many contemporary ethicists the traditional terminology of ordinary-
extraordinary means has outlived its usefulness and could take us only so far, especially in 
the case of handicapped newborns.21 Focusing on the value of human life, McCormick 
                                                 
18 McCormick writes: AA basic human value is challenged by new circumstances, and these 
circumstances demand that imagination and creativity be employed to devise new formulations, a new 
understanding of this value in light of these new circumstances while retaining a basic grasp upon the 
value. For example, in-vitro fertilization poses questions about the meaning of sexuality, parenthood, and 
the family because it challenges their very biological roots.@ McCormick, AA Proposal For >Quality Of 
Life= Criteria For Sustaining Life,@ 76. 
19 McCormick, AThe Best Interests Of The Baby,@ 19. McCormick further states: AWe must admit that 
the terms >ordinary= and >extraordinary= are but code words. That is, they summarize and are vehicles 
for other judgments. They do not solve problems automatically. Rather they are emotional and mental 
preparations for very personal and circumstantial judgments that must take into account the patient=s 
attitudes and value perspectives, or >what the patient would have wanted.= >Ordinary= and 
>extraordinary= merely summarize other underlying judgments. They say very little in and of 
themselves.@ McCormick, AA Proposal For >Quality Of Life= Criteria For Sustaining Life,@ 77. 
20 McCormick further states that: AIt must be remembered that the abiding substance of the Church=s 
teaching, its rock bottom so to speak, is not found in the ordinary means-extraordinary means 
terminology. It is found in a basic value judgment about the meaning of life and death, one that refuses to 
absolutize either. It is that judgment that we must carry with us as we face the medical decisions that 
technology casts upon us.@ McCormick, ATechnology And Morality: An Example Of Medicine,@ 29. 
Emphasis in the original. 
21 McCormick argues there are two reasons for this: First, the terminology too easily hides the 
nature of the judgment being made. The major reference point in factoring out what is Areasonable@ 
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sought to reformulate the ordinary-extraordinary means distinction without abandoning the 
tradition. Contemporary medical problems no longer only concern newborns for whom 
biological death is imminent. Modern medicine and technology have the ability to keep 
almost anyone biologically alive. Therefore, a gradual shift has occurred from the means to 
reverse the dying process to the quality of life sustained and preserved as the result of the 
application of medical technology.22 Today, because of the advancements in medicine and 
technology, the focus is on the quality of life thus saved that establishes a means as 
extraordinary.  
To address this shift in the problem from means to quality of life preserved, McCormick has 
reformulated the ordinary-extraordinary means distinction to mean the benefit-burden 
evaluation.23 For McCormick, "it is clear that the judgments of burden and benefit are value 
judgments, moral choices. They are judgments in which, all things considered, the 
continuance of life is either called for or not worthwhile to the patient."24  In making these 
moral judgments one can see how proportionate reason is used as a tool for determining 
whether a particular life-sustaining treatment is a benefit or a burden, that is, in the best 
interests of the never-competent patient and those involved in the decision-making process. 
The benefit-burden evaluation was also proposed by the Sacred Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith in its Declaration on Euthanasia and by the President's Commission for 
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research in its 
Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment.25 The issuance of the Declaration on Euthanasia in 
1980 by the Magisterium gave McCormick further justification for incorporating the benefit-
burden evaluation into his quality-of-life criterion.26 It also gave him further proof to anchor 
                                                                                                                            
(benefit) and Aexcessive@ (burden) is the patient--his or her condition, biography, prognosis, and 
values. The terminology, however, suggests that attention should fall on the means in an all too 
mechanical way. Second, many people misinterpret the terms to refer to Awhat physicians ordinarily 
do, what is customary.@ This is not what the term means. In their ethical sense, they encompass many 
more dimensions of the situation. Richard  McCormick, Health And Medicine In The Catholic Tradition, 
(New York: Crossroad Press, 1987), 145. 
22 McCormick, ATo Save Or Let Die,@ How Brave A New World?, 345. 
23 Besides McCormick=s benefit-burden evaluation, other ethicists have suggested various terms to 
reformulate the ordinary-extraordinary means distinction. Paul Ramsey suggests that the morally 
significant meaning of ordinary and extraordinary medical means can be reduced almost without 
remainder to two components--a comparison of treatments to determine if they are Amedically 
indicated@ and a patient=s right to refuse treatment. See Paul Ramsey, Ethics At The Edges Of Life: 
Moral And Legal Intersections, (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1978), 153-160. Robert Veatch 
maintains that the terms Aordinary@ and Aextraordinary@ are Aextremely vague and are used 
inconsistently in the literature.@ Beneath this confusion he finds three overlapping but fundamentally 
different uses of the terms: usual versus unusual, useful versus useless, imperative versus elective. See 
Robert Veatch, Death, Dying And The Biological Revolution, (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 
1976), 110-112. For further examples, see McCormick, AThe Quality Of Life, The Sanctity Of Life,@ How 
Brave A New World?, 393-405. 
24 McCormick and John Paris, ASaving Defective Infants,@ How Brave A New World?, 360. 
25 See President=s Commission For The Study Of Ethical Problems In Medicine And Biomedical 
And Behavioral Research, ADeciding To Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical And Legal 
Issues In Treatment Decisions,@ (Washington, D.C., U.S. Printing Office, March 1983): 218-219. 
26 The Congregation concludes that, Ait will be possible to make a correct judgment as to the means 
by studying the type of treatment being used, its degree of complexity or risk, its cost and possibilities 
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his guideline and thus his criterion for treatment decisions in the benefit-burden evaluation. 
Medical treatments are not morally mandatory if they are either gravely burdensome or 
useless for the patient.27  McCormick has a normative understanding of medical futility, 
which considers whether the agreed on potential effect is of any value and benefit to the 
newborn, that is, in the newborn's best interests normatively understood. For McCormick, a 
medical treatment might be successful in achieving an effect (physiologically effective), but 
the effect might not be beneficial to the patient (qualitatively effective). Since the goal of 
medical treatment is to benefit the patient, it follows that nonbeneficial treatment is 
medically futile.28  This entails making a value judgment and the evaluation of whether a 
treatment is a benefit or a burden can be open to personal interpretation. That means these 
evaluations can be borderline and controversial.29 
The two guidelines of McCormick's quality-of-life criterion, even though he argued they 
were both reformulations of the ordinary-extraordinary means distinction, continued to be 
criticized by ethicists Leonard Weber, John Connery and Warren Reich for being too 
relative, subjective, and consequential in nature. To address this criticism McCormick, along 
with ethicist John Paris, S.J., proposed the following norms that would further specify the 
capacity for human relationships and the benefit-burden evaluation:  
                                                                                                                            
of using it, and comparing these elements with the result that can be expected, taking into account the 
state of the sick person and his or her physical and moral resources.@  Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith, ADeclaration On Euthanasia,@ Origins 10 (August 1980): 263. 
27 Ethicists Warren Reich, John Connery, S.J., Leonard Weber, and Donald McCarthy disagree with 
McCormick=s interpretation of the tradition on the benefit-burden distinction. Ethicist Richard Sparks 
writes: AFor Reich, Weber, Connery, and McCarthy the limiting factor is the quality of life, which, if 
judged to be excessively burdensome, can make the presumably beneficial treatment extraordinary and 
optional, [sic] must be caused by or directly related to the use of the means contemplated. In other 
words, >the burden must be the burden of medical treatment, not the burden of handicapped 
existence.=@ Richard Sparks, To Treat Or Not To Treat?: Bioethics And The Handicapped Newborn, 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 110; see also Donald G. McCarthy, ATreating Defective Newborns: Who 
Judges Extraordinary Means?@ Hospital Progress 62 (December 1981): 45-50; John Connery, S.J., 
AProlongation Of Life: A Duty And Its Limits,@ Linacre Quarterly 47 (May 1980):, 151-165; Leonard 
Weber, Who Shall Live?, 88-98; and Warren Reich, AQuality Of Life And Defective Newborn Children: 
An Ethical Analysis,@ in Decision-Making And The Defective Newborn, ed. Chester A. Swinyard 
(Springfield, IL.: Thomas, 1978), 488 -511.  
28 For McCormick, medical futility is determined by the parents in consultation with the health care 
professionals, because a determination must be made of the patient=s medical status and an evaluation 
must be made of the medical intervention. The determination of medical futility entails balancing the 
values of patients, the values of medicine, and the fact that there is much uncertainty in making 
Apredictive medical judgments.@ McCormick=s notion of medical futility is also rooted in his 
understanding of the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence--do no harm to the patient. For a 
more detailed analysis of medical futility, see James F. Drane and John L. Coulehan, AThe Concept Of 
Futility: Parents Do Not Have The Right To Demand Medically Useless Treatment,@ Health Progress 74 
(December 1993): 32; Robert Veatch and Carol Mason Spicer, AFutile Care: Physicians Should Not Be 
Allowed To Refuse To Treat,@ Health Progress 74 (December 1993): 22-27 and Glenn G. Griener, AThe 
Physician=s Authority To Withhold Futile Treatment,@ Journal Of Philosophy And Medicine 20 (April 
1995): 209.. 
29 McCormick and Paris, ASaving Defective Infants,@ How Brave A New World?, 358. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Contemporary Issues in Bioethics 
 
78
1. Life-saving intervention ought not to be omitted for institutional or managerial reasons. 
Included in this specification is the ability of this particular family to cope with a badly 
disabled baby. 
2. Life-sustaining interventions may not be omitted simply because the baby is retarded. 
There may be further complications associated with retardation that justify withholding 
life-sustaining treatment. 
3. Life-sustaining intervention may be omitted or withdrawn when there is excessive 
hardship on the patient, especially when this combines with poor prognosis. 
4. Life-sustaining interventions may be omitted or withdrawn at a point when it becomes 
clear that expected life can be had only for a relatively brief time and only with 
continued use of artificial feeding.30 
These norms or rules do not mandate certain decisions, nor do they replace the role of 
prudence and eliminate conflicts and decisions. They are simply attempts to provide 
outlines of the areas in which prudence should operate.31    
McCormick further specified his quality-of-life criterion to help enlighten medical 
situations for the appropriate decision-makers. However, guidelines, even specified by 
concrete norms, cannot cover all circumstances and every possible situation. McCormick's 
quality-of-life criterion assists the appropriate decision-makers by giving them a range of 
choices. As rational persons, it is up to the appropriate decision-makers to examine each 
situation using proportionate reason, and the guidelines advanced by McCormick in his 
quality-of-life criterion, to determine what is in the best interests of the never-competent 
patient and those involved in the decision-making process. McCormick makes clear that 
no criterion can cover every instance where human discretion must intervene to decide. 
There is always the possibility of human error because we are finite and sinful people. For 
McCormick, "the margin of error tolerable should reflect not only the utter finality of the 
decision (which tends to narrow it), but also the unavoidable uncertainty and doubt 
(which tends to broaden it)".32 With the assistance of these guidelines and norms, 
McCormick believes that the appropriate decision-makers will be given the necessary 
guidance to act responsibly. 
To assist parents and health care professionals further in medical decision-making for 
handicapped newborns five specific diagnostic treatment categories of handicapped 
newborns have been established. These categories attempt to encompass, as far as possible, 
the entire spectrum of handicapped newborns. They are based on McCormick's moral 
criterion of the potential for human relationships.  
McCormick has plotted the two extreme positions on this spectrum of handicapped 
newborns, but has left the conflictual middle, to be filled in by health care professionals and 
bioethicsts.33 These diagnostic categories will attempt to complete the conflictual middle. 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 358-359. 
31 Ibid., 359. 
32 Ibid., 360. 
33 McCormick writes: AIt is the task of physicians to provide some more concrete categories or 
presumptive biological symptoms for this human judgment. For instance, nearly all would likely agree 
that the anencephalic infant is without relational potential. On the other hand, the same cannot be said 
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The conflictual middle pertains to those neonatal anomalies that fall into the gray area of 
treatment decisions.34 These diagnostic treatment categories have been arranged in a way 
that demonstrates the application of McCormick's best interests category. There is a logical 
progression on the spectrum from the newborn who does not warrant medical treatment to 
the newborn who does warrant medical treatment. The five diagnostic treatment categories 
are: 
1. The handicapped newborns whose potential for human relationships is completely 
nonexistent.  
2. The handicapped newborn who has a potential for human relationships but whose 
potential is utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival. 
3. The handicapped newborn who has a potential for human relationships but the 
underlying medical condition will result in imminent death. 
4. The handicapped newborn who has the potential for human relationships but after 
medical treatment has been initiated, it becomes apparent that the treatment may be 
medically futile. 
5. The handicapped newborn who has the potential for human relationships and has a 
correctable or treatable condition.35 
Establishing a full set of diagnostic treatment categories is not a panacea for determining 
treatment decisions for handicapped newborns. Not all medical conditions can be placed in 
specific categories; there is a marked difference in the severity of conditions within each 
category. Not all health care professionals or even bioethicists could or would agree to these 
specific categories. Nevertheless, as McCormick argues, "we ought to attempt, as far as 
possible, to approach neonatal disabilities through diagnostic categories, always realizing 
that such categories cannot deflate important differences and that there will always remain 
gray areas."36 The establishment of these five diagnostic treatment categories is an attempt to 
meet the challenge set before health care professionals and bioethicists to assist parents and 
medical professionals in making treatment decisions for handicapped newborns. 
4. Ethical evaluation 
In the case of Baby X, the medical professionals have ascertained after five months that any 
further aggressive medical treatment would be medically futile for this child. According to 
the physicians, Baby X has severe underdeveloped lungs, ribs too tiny to allow normal 
breathing and pressure on the spinal cord that disrupts brain signals controlling respiration. 
                                                                                                                            
for the mongoloid infant. The task ahead is to attach relational potential to presumptive biological 
symptoms for the gray areas between such extremes.@ McCormick, ATo Save Or Let Die,@ How Brave A 
New World?, 349-350. 
34 This would include anomalies in which the newborn has the potential for human relationships, but 
the potential is utterly submerged in the mere struggle for survival, or the medical condition will result in 
imminent death, or it has been determined that further treatment is medically futile. Certain anomalies that 
would fall within this category would be spina bifida, hypoplastic left heart syndrome, trisomy 13, trisomy 
18, Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, etc. 
35 For a more complete analysis of these five diagnostic categories see, Peter A. Clark, To Treat Or 
Not To Treat: The Ethical Methodology of Richard A. McCormick, S.J. As Applied To Treatment Decisions For 
Handicapped Newborns, (Omaha, Ne.: Creighton University Press, 2003). 
36 McCormick, AThe Best Interests Of The Baby,@ 24. 
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Thus, Baby X is in a terminal condition and is slowly suffocating. Mechanical ventilation at 
this point is only prolonging the dying process. It would appear that Baby X would fit under 
diagnostic category four.  
In this fourth diagnostic treatment category, since the potential for human relationships is 
present, McCormick's second guideline of his quality-of-life criterion--the benefit-burden 
evaluation--would be applied to determine whether Baby X ought to be treated. What is to 
be determined is whether the benefit of the treatment will outweigh the burden to the 
newborn. If the parents in consultation with the health care professionals determine that 
further medical treatment would not improve the newborn=s prognosis, or benefit the 
overall well-being of the newborn, then, all things considered, parents should decide that 
further treatment would not be in the best interests of the newborn. A newborn diagnosed 
with thanatophoric dysplasia is in a terminal condition and according to medical 
authorities, further medical treatment is medically futile, that is, any possible medical effect 
is of no benefit to the newborn. To support this position McCormick’s third norm, that 
further specifies the burden-benefit evaluation, can be applied. “Life sustaining 
interventions may be omitted or withdrawn when there is excessive hardship, especially 
when this combines with poor prognosis.” Therefore, it appears that further treatment for 
Baby X is not morally obligatory, because it is a disproportionate means. 
The notion of a normative understanding of best interests considers not only the relevant 
medical facts but also the relevant social and familial factors. Financial and emotional costs 
ought to be considered. That means, if the social factors are excessive, then the newborn 
should not and would not want to be treated, because it would place excessive burdens on 
those who must care for the newborn's existence. What the newborn ought to want should 
encompass the needs of those who will care for this child. Baby X is in a terminal state and 
further aggressive treatments will only prolong the dying process. Both social and familial 
factors ought to play a proportionate role in determining the benefit/burden evaluation.37 
In conclusion, when a handicapped newborn has the potential for human relationships but 
after initiating treatment, it becomes apparent that the treatment is medically futile, parents 
in consultation with health care professionals are not morally obliged to continue medical 
treatment. This is a value judgment that is based on McCormick's guidelines of relational 
potential and benefit/burden evaluation. McCormick's moral criterion sets basic parameters 
and enlightens the particular medical situation. Ultimately, the parents will use prudence to 
examine the medical facts and to weigh, all things considered, whether the burdens of 
treatment outweigh the benefits to the newborn. In this diagnostic treatment category, the 
burdens and benefits need to be weighed carefully. However, with the severity of this 
particular medical anomaly the burdens clearly outweigh the benefits to the newborn. 
                                                 
37 It should be noted that McCormick=s position on social and familial factors has been criticized for 
being too restrictive and deviating from both the Catholic tradition and from his own normative 
understanding of Abest interests.@ McCormick claims that his restrictive notion of social and familial 
factors, as they pertain to treatment decisions for handicapped newborns, is due to the fact that a broader 
interpretation could lead to social utilitarianism. This caution is certainly relevant because the possibility of 
potential abuse is always present. However, the safeguards McCormick has built into his quality-of-life 
criterion--guidelines and norms--should help to alleviate the possibility of such abuse. In addition, health 
care professionals serve as a safeguard in that they can act as the newborn=s advocate should they suspect 
abuse.  
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Therefore, in the best interests of the newborn, and all concerned, parents in consultation 
with health care professionals have the moral obligation to forgo or withdraw treatment for 
a newborn in these circumstances. 
McCormick argues that his moral criterion is appropriate for decision-makers because it 
considers not only the relevant medical facts and the pertinent circumstances of the 
situation, but also familial and social factors, such as, religious, cultural, emotional, and 
financial factors. Parents in consultation with health care professionals can best determine 
what the handicapped newborn ought to want and protect his or her best interests by using 
McCormick's quality-of-life moral criterion. As reasonable people, parents are most 
knowledgeable about the family situation into which the newborn is born. This includes 
knowing the financial, emotional, and social factors. Parents can also weigh and balance the 
religious and cultural values that inform their decision-making. Health care professionals 
have the specialized medical knowledge and clinical expertise that can assist parents in the 
decision-making process. They also have a level of objectivity that parents may lack because 
of the overwhelming emotional stress of the situation. Together, parents and health care 
professionals are able to determine what are the appropriate needs of this newborn, to 
assess these needs, and to determine whether medical treatment is in the best interests of the 
newborn integrally and adequately considered.  
5. Conclusion 
McCormick’s moral criterion is appropriate for Christian decision-makers because it 
emphasizes the reasonable from within a Christian context. It stresses the need for decision-
makers to examine the medical facts, the circumstances of the situation, foreseeable 
consequences, social and familial factors, and other pertinent data before deciding on an 
appropriate course of action. McCormick's moral criterion also stresses that these facts are to 
be considered always within the context of the Christian story, so that the best interests of 
the handicapped newborn are always promoted and protected. Treatment decisions for 
handicapped newborns are value judgments that must be based on the appropriate needs of 
the newborn. These value judgments can possibly become distorted by self-interested 
perspectives and technological considerations. Christian decision-makers who use 
McCormick's moral criterion are not immune from making mistakes. We are a finite and 
sinful people. What is being said is that because the content of this moral criterion is 
reasonable, and because these decisions are made within the context of the Christian story, 
less chance exists that such treatment decisions will be pushed to the extremes. McCormick's 
moral criterion is appropriate for Christian decision-makers because it protects the best 
interests of the handicapped newborns by promoting value judgments that are grounded in 
reason and informed by the Christian story. 
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